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I'm afraid I'm going to talk more today about the obstacles to love 
than I am about love itself. I'm going to talk about the social circum-
stances in which hate arises, and particularly about the issues 
we're facing in our country and in the world right now, on a morn-
ing when dozens more people have been killed in Iraq, and when 
American warplanes are routinely bombing civilian neighborhoods 
in a manner that would have seemed utterly impossible—shocking 
and barbaric—to many of us, I think, just a short time ago. 
The newspapers are dreadful in what they don't tell us every 
day. The New York Times reported yesterday, "American armored 
vehicles roared through the villages surrounding Falluja, the west-
ern town at the heart of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, on Friday, as 
warplanes pounded rebel positions and ground forces ratcheted up 
their preparations for what appeared to be an imminent assault on 
the city."1 This is sheer propaganda, because already in the first line 
is the idea that our warplanes are pounding "rebel positions," not 
bombing civilian neighborhoods. We learned last week from The 
Lancet magazine, which published the most serious epidemiological 
study that has been undertaken regarding the casualties in Iraq 
since the war began, that there are by best estimates—though 
admittedly this is with high uncertainty—100,000 deaths in excess 
of what would have been expected based on prewar circumstances, 
and that the vast majority of those deaths have come through vio-
lent attacks by U.S. forces, principally bombing by our aircraft.2 
And so we enact Guernica every day, and our newspapers report it 
as "warplanes pounding rebel positions." The Associated Press this 
morning said the same thing, that Marines fired a barrage of 
artillery at "rebel positions" inside Falluja; U.S. jets have been 
pounding the "rebel bastion" for days—not the city. 
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This is an obstacle to love, I would say. This is mass slaugh-
ter under the rubric of foreign policy. We really need to under-
stand—and we don't—what is happening: how our society is 
becoming dehumanized and dehumanizing, in ways that so many 
other societies have been in the past. We need to understand this 
so that we can get a grip on ourselves, first and foremost. We also 
need to understand this so that we can help address all of the much 
deeper unmet challenges of the world that we really could do some-
thing about. 
Every day, as we are killing uncounted numbers of innocent 
civilians in Iraq, we're also, on the other hand, leaving perhaps 
20,000 innocents—in Africa, principally, but also in other parts of 
the world—to die of malaria, an utterly preventable and treatable 
disease; of AIDS; of tuberculosis; of diarrheal disease; of simple res-
piratory infections; because while we are spending $450 billion on 
our military adventures, we are spending just $15 billion in total for 
everything we purport to do in the world with regard to development 
aid for poor countries. Incidentally, of that $15 billion in aid money, 
$2 billion in total is for Africa, where thousands die every day, and 
perhaps 6 million die every year, of absolutely preposterous—trag-
ic, because easily preventable—causes. 
So that's the world we're living in, and the world we need to 
understand. Love, or the obstacles to love, has a lot to do with this 
world, because right now in our society we are unable to take seri-
ously life and its value. And no one seems less able to take serious-
ly the value of life than the so-called pro-life forces. We need to 
think more seriously about life after the fetus is born. If we did, we'd 
have a different approach. 
It is stunning to me, and a matter of profound personal angst 
as well, that religion—at least some aspects of it—seems unable to 
address this issue in any suitable manner right now. What we are 
told by the opinion surveys is that on average, those in our society 
who report the greatest degree of religious observance are those who 
most strongly support the war effort and hold most strongly some 
of the dangerous notions pushing us in this direction. 
In recent surveys that you can find at the web site of the Pew 
Research Center (http://pewresearch.org)—a wonderful site with 
tremendous amounts of detailed information from over a dozen sur-
veys every year—you can learn how various kinds of demographic 
indicators and degrees of religious observance correlate with atti-
tudes towards the war in Iraq, towards Islam, and toward many 
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other political and social issues. Regarding the military effort in 
Iraq, of all the demographic breakdowns that are offered—by 
income, by class, by education, by gender, by race, by region—the 
category that most strongly supports the war in Iraq was white, 
Protestant, evangelical Christians. In a survey conducted this sum-
mer, 69 percent of this group said it was the right decision to go to 
war against Iraq, and 22 percent felt it was the wrong decision. In 
no other demographic group did the proportion of members 
expressing approval of the war come anywhere close to this.3 
When one tries to understand what might lie behind this, it's 
perhaps not surprising to note—in fact, this is exactly what 111 
argue—that correlated with the approval of going to war with Iraq is 
a radical "us"-versus-"them" vision of the world. In particular, Pew 
Research Center surveys also tell us that the demographic cohort in 
our society that most strongly holds an "unfavorable" view of Islam 
is exactly the same cohort that most strongly supports the war. In 
a survey that was conducted in July 2004 the question was asked 
whether the respondents had a favorable or unfavorable view of 
Islam. Within the overall survey, 39 percent of the American public 
answered "favorable" and 37 percent answered "unfavorable." But 
again, after scanning all of the categories, one notices that within 
the white evangelical Protestant group—about a quarter of the pop-
ulation—a greater proportion of respondents had a negative view of 
Islam: 46 percent said they viewed Islam unfavorably, 29 percent 
favorably. Among those white evangelical Protestants who reported 
attending church weekly, the difference was even more strident: 54 
percent viewed Islam unfavorably, 23 percent favorably. No other 
division in the entire survey, none of the other demographic cate-
gories, expressed anything close to this degree of disapproval. White 
Catholics reported, on balance, a positive view of Islam (43 percent 
answered "favorable," 34 percent "unfavorable"); those who called 
themselves secular had positive view (50 percent favorable, 25 per-
cent unfavorable). Non-evangelical white Protestants also had, on 
balance, a positive view (40 percent favorable, 36 percent unfavor-
able).4 
So we have had confirmed what perhaps we knew intuitively, 
but needed to better understand. The swing vote in the presidential 
election, and by far the most strongly targeted vote of the election, 
the group that split 80-20 in favor of President Bush, was not only 
the so-called religious voters, but particularly those voters who have 
the strongest tendency to divide the world into good and evil, into 
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those they view favorably and those they view unfavorably. Along 
with expressing this tendency, white evangelical Protestants were 
also the single group in our society most in favor of the war in Iraq. 
These survey findings raise a lot of questions, of course, about the 
role in our society of this variant of religion—one of the largest, most 
important religious trends, certainly the most ascendant in our 
society. 
I'm completely unequipped to give you a proper, full answer 
to such questions. All I can do is share with you one part of an 
answer from the disciplines I am responsible for knowing at least a 
little bit about: the disciplines within the human sciences and the 
social sciences that try to understand, through various scientific 
approaches, the bases of human nature. There are four different 
sciences that have come together recently to help advance our 
understanding of these issues, and I want to take a few minutes to 
share with you insights from them. 
The first of these fields is evolutionary science, in particular 
the early, still-important attempts of evolutionary psychology to 
understand what kind of behavioral imprints may have been select-
ed in the course of human evolution. The second is animal-behav-
ior experimentation, which now shows us some of the tendencies 
towards or reasons for cooperation or lack of cooperation, how 
behavioral norms evolve, and how the sense of fairness develops, in 
other primates as well as in humans. The third is neurobiology, 
which increasingly is giving us interesting tools for grasping why 
humans behave the way they do in situations in which they have 
choices between cooperating or not cooperating with others. And 
the fourth is game theory, so-called, which tries to understand how 
people behave in specified, carefully designed circumstances in 
which their cooperation or noncooperation can lead to alternative 
payoffs—benefits or losses—for them vis-ä-vis others. All of these 
approaches, coming together, help us better understand some of 
the conundrums of human society: why societies do or do not coop-
erate, why individuals do or do not cooperate, and how cultural 
institutions—and in this instance, particularly religious institu-
tions—coevolve, in reflection of our deeper human instincts, if you 
will. 
What do the biologists have to say about these issues, at least 
as I understand them? A first point is that the purely biological view 
of natural selection and evolution suggest that cooperation per se 
between individuals of a species is actually a rather rare phenome-
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non. In the species in which we see large degrees of cooperation, the 
social insects, that cooperation is easily understood. Every individ-
ual in the colony is virtually identical genetically—they are at least 
siblings—and there is a biological basis to their very strong degree 
of cooperation. It is awe-inspiring, of course, what is accomplished 
with that degree of genetic similarity, molded by natural selection to 
produce wondrous behaviors and outcomes. There is a very sophis-
ticated division of responsibility in social-insect communities, but 
this is surely grounded on the underlying genetic near-identity of 
sibling populations in those communities. 
Other than the social insects, there is no species, nothing 
closely resembling the human species, that displays anything like 
the degree of cooperation that human beings display, and display 
routinely. In nature there is a great deal of cooperative behavior 
between individuals of a species, but such behavior does not exhib-
it anything close to the complexity that we see in our species. 
Probably the best explanation of the cooperative behavior we see in 
other species is an extension of the explanation for the cooperative 
behavior of the social insects: what's called kin altruism, or kin-
based altruism, or kin selection. These are terms for the idea that 
individuals cooperate with other individuals to which they are relat-
ed. The individuals don't have to be genetically identical to cooper-
ate. So long as the relationship is close enough—brothers, sisters, 
nieces, nephews, cousins—one individual of a species will take risks 
for another individual, because taking those risks, or accepting 
those individual costs of cooperation, improves the probability that 
genetic material closely resembling that individual's genetic materi-
al will be propagated, thus also propagating the genes that enabled 
that cooperative behavior in the first place. In other words, nature 
can select for cooperative behavior. Outside of the human species, 
however, this is pretty limited, and when it does take place, what is 
being selected is genetic coding for cooperative behavior that is ben-
eficial for closely related kin. 
It makes sense that the natural selection of cooperative 
behavior would be limited, because the dominant idea of natural 
selection is that there is an intense fight for survival between the 
individuals of any particular species. That is the whole point that 
Charles Darwin, building on the insight of Thomas Malthus, under-
stood already a century and a half ago. (It probably doesn't help our 
discourse that only 12 percent of the American public professes to 
believe in natural selection. This puts us at a disadvantage in hav-
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ing a good discussion of these issues. According to a February 2001 
Gallup poll, nearly half of the American public hold a strict cre-
ationist view, another 37 percent hold a more or less religious-evo-
lutionist view, and only 12 percent profess a belief in natural selec-
tion.5 I profess a belief in natural selection, and I believe that with-
out such belief it's pretty hopeless for us to make much headway in 
drawing upon the sciences to help us understand these issues, 
because within the whole gamut of modern science, natural selec-
tion is one of the most deeply, strongly, pervasively documented of 
our scientific ideas.) 
The examples of kin selection pose, then, a big biological puz-
zle for humans. The question is not, "Why do humans kill each 
other, or fight with each other, or struggle with each other?"— 
because biologists take those behaviors as the normal baseline. The 
question is rather, "Why do humans cooperate with each other as 
much as they do?" And it is quite remarkable how much we do 
cooperate. It's quite tragic that we fail to cooperate even more, 
because we could do so much more to enrich our lives. But, still, 
the level of cooperation is phenomenal compared with anything else 
seen in nature other than, for example, a bee colony. 
The ideas of sociobiology generally cluster around the notion 
that for human beings, there is a positive selection advantage to 
cooperative behavior; and there is a lot of evidence for this. There is 
still the conundrum, however, of why we see so much more of this 
behavior in the human species than in animal species. The question 
leads us to explore the idea that underpinning cooperation between 
humans is the uniquely human, cultural propagation of norms and 
values, not merely the biological propagation of genetically coded 
behavior. 
The basic idea that evolutionary biologists and game theorists 
have tried to explore is the concept of altruism, defined with various 
degrees of subtlety. They have described, as one major variant, what 
they call reciprocal altruism. The idea of reciprocal altruism is that 
111 cooperate with you if I can expect some return from you in the 
future; 111 give up something in the short run in order to gain the 
mutual advantage that is the point of cooperation. It may be costly 
for me at the moment to cooperate with you compared with tricking 
you, but 111 do it if I can expect a future return. Instead of, or in 
addition to, kin-based altruism, which is genetically coded, human 
beings exhibit reciprocal altruism, which is culturally based. The 
tendency toward reciprocal altruism could, conceivably, be geneti-
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cally coded, but it would be only in the human species that my 
cooperation with you is predicated somehow on the notion that in 
the future I'm going to get something in return. 
Now how might I be able to expect that in the future, I will get 
something in return? One way is through my having a reputation as 
a cooperator, so that other cooperative individuals will be willing to 
work with me, knowing that I am likely to cooperate with them. 
Another way is through what is called an iterated gain, which 
occurs when we have repeated occasions to deal with each other in 
business or in social interactions. If you and I are interacting 
repeatedly, then cheating on you early on is probably not a great 
way to encourage your cooperation, extending into the future. 
Repeated interactions, in which individuals learn whether they can 
trust one another, can support a level of cooperation that a single, 
anonymous interaction cannot support. These concepts of reputa-
tional altruism, or reciprocal altruism, have been developed through 
observation and confirmation in experimental settings. 
It's also been noticed that a particular pattern of behavior 
called the tit-for-tat strategy is pretty robust among humans in 
small-group interactions. The situation, in general, with coopera-
tion is that if we cooperate with each other, we will both be better 
off. But if you take the cooperative step and I trick you or cheat you, 
I'm better off than you are in the short term, because you've con-
tributed something on my behalf and I have not contributed some-
thing on your behalf. On the other hand, if neither of us ever trusts 
the other and we both cheat—or what the game theorists call 
defect—all the time, then we both lose. So the puzzle is, how can we 
sustain a good cooperative outcome over time? The tit-for-tat strat-
egy is a way to achieve this. It is described as cooperative, retaliato-
ry, and forgiving. It works like this: the first time you deal with 
someone—let's say you are hoping to develop a new business part-
nership—you cooperate with the other person. If your partner then 
cheats on you, you don't cooperate with him or her the next time, 
because you're not a sucker. You revert to a noncooperative, non-
trusting position. But if, later on, the cheater comes to you on his 
or her hands and knees, begging your apology and indulgence, and 
starts cooperating again, you shift back to cooperating. You've made 
your point. The cheating won't happen again. And so this strategy 
is called cooperative, because you start out on a cooperative basis. 
It's called retaliatory, because if you are cheated, you stop cooper-
ating; you stop putting your money into the common till. And it's 
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called forgiving, because if you are cheated but the other side 
reverts to cooperative behavior, you're willing to go back to being 
cooperative also, because there's an advantage to it in the end. This 
basic strategy has shown its social value in innumerable real-world 
circumstances and in innumerable test circumstances in what's 
called experimental game theory. 
One problem with the concepts of reciprocal altruism and the 
tit-for-tat strategy, however, is that they still don't explain why we 
cooperate in an anonymous setting, why we behave as well as we do 
in that kind of situation. Even when we don't know the people— 
when we're at a restaurant in a foreign city, for example—most of 
us still leave a tip, even though we're never going to see that waiter 
again. Most of us do, because we think it's "the right thing to do." 
An idea that comes into play here is that in society there seem to be 
individuals who are pure altruists, and they play a double role. The 
pure altruists get pleasure in following social norms of cooperation, 
and they reward the cooperators by making the effort to praise 
them. They also take pleasure in punishing the noncooperators. So 
the pure altruists are enforcers of social norms through positive and 
negative incentives. What the game theorists have shown is that if 
you sprinkle into a population some of these pure altruists—the 
term doesn't mean they're nice people; they could be people who 
take delight in punishing others who violate social norms—their 
presence can support a tremendous amount of cooperation, even 
among relatively anonymous individuals who are interacting with-
out a heavy dose of repeated interactions. 
Where neurobiology enters the picture is in showing, through 
nuclear magnetic resonance scans, the actual release of endorphins 
and various other brain markers in people who are punishing norm-
violators in game settings. The brilliant neurobiologists are increas-
ingly able to find physical markers of the pleasures of cooperation 
and the pleasures of norm enforcement. This means that there 
could be a mixture of hardwired behaviors and culturally set behav-
iors in human beings that have an actual physical reflection in 
brain biology, which may play a role in making one's behavior con-
sistent with social norms. This is at least the beginning of a natu-
ral, biological and behavioral explanation of why and how coopera-
tion among human beings is extended much more broadly than we 
see in other species, including other mammals. 
Our next step is to understand the social context of coopera-
tive and noncooperative behaviors. Here the basic idea is that if 
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you're in a setting where cooperation counts, but where there's geo-
graphical isolation and limited migration between different groups, 
a paradox can arise: behavior can be selected that supports strong 
within-group cooperation and strong across-group noncooperation. 
Under the right circumstances—for example, where you have many 
different societies competing over scarce resources, and there's not 
a lot of migration or intermarriage between these groups—the result 
that arises, according to game theory, is the evolution of coopera-
tion within the group, but also the development of very strong social 
norms against cross-group cooperation. And the cross-group non-
cooperation strengthens the within-group coherence. 
This begins to sound a lot like religion, because almost all 
religious precepts promote strong within-group cooperation and 
often very aggressive cross-group noncooperation, frequently 
backed by tremendous taboos against sitting down to eat with 
members of another group, certainly against intermarriage with 
them, against even business relations, and the like. This paradox— 
of a society fostering a tremendous amount of cooperative behavior, 
but within a sea of noncooperation and conflict—is called an evolu-
tionarily stable strategy. It occurs in a context in which groups 
without a lot of natural migration—say, because of geographical 
boundaries—need to strengthen their internal cohesion because of 
competition with an external group. 
One can think of what those geographical and ecological 
boundaries might be. The boundary between followers of 
Christianity and followers of Islam, for the last one thousand years, 
has been the boundary between the humid, temperate zone of 
Europe and the northern tip of Africa, and the arid zones, the so-
called B climates, the steppes and the desert climates across north-
ern Africa, Arabia, and into Central Asia. Migration, lifestyles, and 
patterns of survival have been quite different between these ecolog-
ical divides. And what the theory might suggest—speaking now very 
loosely—is a hardening of attitudes across that ecological division, 
and the development of very strong norms of within-group coopera-
tion and across-group noncooperation, confrontation, and even vio-
lence. And this, of course, is what we have seen. 
Of course I'm speaking in extremely generic and superficial 
terms, but perceptions of "the clash of civilizations," of wars across 
religious groups, are now upon us as we certainly could not have 
expected just a few years ago. I believe that what we're seeing now 
are the kinds of us-versus-them attitudes and behaviors that reflect 
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very deep human traits, which tend to become exacerbated, as the 
theory emphasizes, during times of crisis. 
In all of the strategic interactions I've been describing, there 
are multiple possible outcomes and multiple possible dynamics. 
Our trust in the Other depends on recent history and recent behav-
iors, and downward spirals of distrust and conflict can easily arise 
out of circumstances in which just previously there was at least a 
fragile sense of cooperation across groups. Because of the terrible 
anxieties wrought by 9/11, and the lies and blunders of the admin-
istration, our country has been on a course of profound dehuman-
ization of the Other in Iraq, to the point where—as indicated by the 
New York Times and Associated Press stories I mentioned earlier— 
we don't even regard life and death under the bombs as worthy of 
reporting or counting. And so what was decried as a massacre at My 
Lai thirty years ago is not even considered worthy of mention now. 
The blitheness and ease with which we kill tens of thousands is a 
sign of our dehumanization. 
How many of you noticed the study reported in The Lancet, by 
the way? How many of you read anguished accounts in the New 
York Times about the implications of that study? I didn't see any. 
Maybe there was a short notice of it. But if so it came and went, 
because we didn't think it worth pausing even to ask what it would 
mean if in fact that study is right, and 100,000 civilians have been 
killed by us; this wasn't considered worth even reflecting upon. All 
year the New York Times has reported, not the story of civilian 
deaths, but American attitudes toward the war. In May 2004, the 
Times conducted interviews in Oswego, Illinois, a small city por-
trayed as a good place to "sample mainstream Republican opinion." 
One businessman is quoted as saying, "Let's kill them all. Let's wipe 
them off the face of the earth." The same article quotes Rush 
Limbaugh remarking, in response to the Abu Ghraib prison photo-
graphs, "They're the ones who are perverted. They are the ones who 
are dangerous. They are the ones who are subhuman. They are the 
ones who are human debris, not the United States of America, not 
our soldiers and not our prison guards."6 These are the mecha-
nisms of profound dehumanization of the Other, which is the psy-
chological, political, and social preparation for mass killing accom-
panied by feelings of vindication and self-righteousness. 
Incidentally, I think that behind the international revulsion at 
our actions in Iraq was one simple notion. If you think about this 
deeply embedded sense of what is a fair strategy in a competitive 
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world—the tit-for-tat strategy of cooperate, retaliate, forgive that I 
have described—then starting out with the noncooperative 
approach, where a new government in the United States launches a 
preemptive attack, is a fundamental violation of what we take to be 
appropriate behavior. My own view is that the preemptive war doc-
trine is not just an uneasy, problematic thing, but runs against pro-
foundly held views about what is appropriate and fair behavior. We 
fundamentally depend on cooperation, and if we start out in a non-
cooperative mode, that's where we're surely going to end up. 
Let me conclude with the observation that in the midst of 
killing each other in Iraq with increasing frequency and with 
increasing dehumanization, at least as tragic as the direct misery 
resulting from these actions—perhaps even more tragic, in an arith-
metic sense—are all of our lost opportunities, the things that we're 
not doing by failing to cooperate on the planet. 
For me, the costs of the Iraq war are not only the 100,000 
civilian deaths in Iraq and the 1,100 American deaths on the 
ground, or the $200 billion that has been or is about to be spent on 
this ludicrous, tragic, wrongheaded effort, but also the fact that the 
war has utterly and completely taken our attention away from the 
things that we need to be doing if we really are "pro-life" for the peo-
ple who are alive on the planet today, and for their children and 
their children's children. We're neglecting massively the suffering of 
the poor in the world. We're failing to respond to the literally mil-
lions and millions of lives we could be saving if we devoted a tiny 
fraction of what we're devoting to war toward buying bed nets to 
help prevent poor children in Africa from dying of malaria by the 
thousands every day; or toward helping to get antiretroviral medi-
cine to people dying of AIDS—to the two million who will die of AIDS 
in Africa this year; or toward helping get soil nutrients to farmers, 
so that hundreds of millions of people will not go to bed hungry 
every night and thereby become vulnerable to death by infectious 
diseases that wouldn't kill anyone who had an adequate level of 
nutrition. And of course in the same way, we're also neglecting the 
great, longer-term challenges of the profound environmental degra-
dation and climate change that we're instilling, which is not just 
hypothetical, not just something for "the day after tomorrow," but is 
here today. It's the drought over the last fifteen years that stands 
behind the current situation in Darfur, which we portray as a polit-
ical disaster but which is actually an ecological catastrophe. It is the 
insufficient rainfall in eastern Sudan that has pitted communities 
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against each other who are together fighting for survival, with not 
enough to eat and not enough water for their herds and flocks. 
These are the things we ought to be working on. As we divide 
the world between "us" and "them" and we make our best efforts to 
kill the "them," what we're also doing is killing our own hopes. 
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